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TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES:
A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
Catherine Lotrionte*
INTRODUCTION
In the last couple of decades, the threat from transnational
terrorist organizations has prompted many States to reevaluate how
international and domestic laws can effectively operate to counter
these threats. Although terrorists have conducted violent acts for
centuries, it has only been since the early 1990s that terrorist
groups such as Al Qaeda (“Al Qaeda”) have been effective in
extending their span of operations globally and continuously. With
the global reach of such groups, they have successfully threatened
the fundamental security of States with a magnitude of violence
never envisioned by the drafters of the legal instruments that guide
State behavior in this area. Today, States struggle to reevaluate
how these laws are applicable to this new category of enemy. This
article examines the relevant domestic and international legal
framework for countering the modern threats from terrorism,
focusing on the U.S. drone program as one tactical tool to counter
terrorists.
As armed drones fly through the skies, seeking out their
targets, they are tasked to kill those enemies that are actively
engaged in warfare against the United States. The drones are
tasked to target and kill the enemy. Their function is generally
described as “targeted killings.” Despite the frequency of the use
of the term “targeted killings,” such term is not defined in U.S. or
international law. This article adopts the definition provided by
the United Nations Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”);
accordingly, a targeted killing is “the intentional, premeditated and
deliberate use of lethal force by States or their agents under the
color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict,
*
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against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of
the perpetrator.”1 Targeted killings are distinguishable from
assassinations or extrajudicial killings, terms often used
interchangeably. While targeted killings can be legal depending on
the circumstances of each case, extrajudicial killings and
assassinations are never legal. The legality of a specific targeted
killing depends on the context in which it is conducted, whether in
self-defense, during armed conflict, or outside of armed conflict.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
has been engaged in a declared armed conflict with members of Al
Qaeda, a terrorist organization. The genesis of the conflict dates
back to the early 1990s. In 1991, Al Qaeda targeted American
soldiers in Somalia. In 1993, the organization tried to take down
the World Trade Center by detonating a bomb in a basement
garage. In 1998, it carried out coordinated attacks on two U.S.
embassies in East Africa. And in 2000, Al Qaeda attempted to
sink the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer ship, ripping a hole
into the ship’s hull, resulting in the deaths of 17 U.S. servicemen.
These are some of the successful attacks by Al Qaeda that predated
the 9/11 attacks, not including those attacks that were thwarted or
failed. Post-9/11, Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to seek to
bring violence to Americans. Fortunately, many attempts have
been prevented largely due to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
U.S. counterterrorism strategy seeks to deprive terrorists of any
safe haven from which to operate; in the process, the United States
has killed thousands of operatives, captured or killed two thirds of
their leadership, and destroyed bases in Afghanistan.2 Still, Al

1

Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 24,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); NILS MELZER, TARGETED
KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2009) (“the use of lethal force attributable
to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation
to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those
targeting them.”).
2
Paul R. Pillar, Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda, 27 WASH. Q. 101, 101–
02 (2004), available at
http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer_pillar.pdf.
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Qaeda continues to plan and carry out new terrorist attacks,
extending its reach in places like London, Madrid, and Bali.
The reality is that since the early 1990s, the United States
has been in conflict with a violent group. Al Qaeda and its
affiliates continue to infiltrate the United States, attack the United
States, kill Americans, and seek to overthrow the nation with a
level of sophistication and magnitude that previously only States
could command. Until 9/11, however, the United States chose to
address these threats as criminal acts by a gang of bandits (with a
few rare exceptions that will be discussed below), seeking to
subpoena, capture, arrest, try and convict them. The theory was
that the criminal justice system could function as a weapon of
deterrence against terrorists, preventing further attacks. After 9/11,
however, recognizing the real limitations of the criminal system as
a counterterrorism tool, the United States acted swiftly, using
lethal force to stop and prevent the on-going terrorist attacks that
had threatened the United States for a decade.
The legal justification to use force, including targeted
killings, against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces has
been stated by the U.S. government as twofold: self-defense and
the laws of armed conflict.3 The targets are those terrorists who
have already conducted armed attacks against the United States or
are in the process of planning such attacks. These targets pose a
threat to the national security of the United States. They are either
members of Al Qaeda, the group that conducted the 9/11 attacks,
the Taliban, the group that assisted Al Qaeda, groups that have
partnered with Al Qaeda since 9/11 to pursue the same objectives
of attacking the United States, or individuals who are directly
supporting these terrorists in conducting attacks. The critical
element of analysis is that each individual targeted to be killed by a
drone poses a real, current or anticipated threat, as assessed by the
U.S. military or intelligence professionals.

3

Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech before
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
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While the use of armed drones to kill terrorists may be a
new technology only deployed by the United States after 9/11, as a
recent report by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence stated,
“Most of the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and
planned systems are well understood and are simply a variation of
those associated with manned systems.”4 In terms of both the U.S.
domestic legal framework as well as the international legal
framework, the use of lethal force in self-defense against threats
(past, present and anticipated) has been well established in codified
legal rules (the U.S. Constitution, statutes, treaties) and in
customary law based on policies and practices of the majority of
States. Certainly, all States maintain the domestic legal authority
to act in self-defense when faced by threats that challenge the
national security of the State. International law has affirmatively
supported that authority, allowing States to use force to defend
against those greatest kinds of threats. Furthermore, since at least
the signing of the Geneva Conventions, and previously through
custom, the authority to engage in self-defense and armed conflict
is not unlimited. Rather, international law has established rules for
those acting in self-defense and those engaged in armed hostilities.
This article examines how these rules apply to the U.S. drone
program.
I. U.S. TARGETED KILLINGS: ARTICULATING THE “UNWILLING AND
UNABLE” TEST
Less than a week after the terrorist attacks against the
United States on 9/11, President Bush signed a secret order
authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) to use armed
drones to kill members of Al Qaeda as well as members of the

4

U.K. Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, The UK Approach
to Unmanned Aircraft Systems 502 (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdpnlyres/F9335CB2-73FC-4761-A428DB7DF4BEC02C/0/20110505JDN_211_UAS_v2U.pdf (citing Tony Gillespie
& Robin West, Requirements of Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set by
Legal Issues, DEF. SCI. & TECH. LAB., Dec. 14, 2010,
http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/journal_v4n2.html).
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Taliban and other associated forces in the territory of other States.5
On November 4, 2002, an unmanned Predator drone, controlled by
the CIA, fired a Hellfire missile at a car in the desert outside the
Yemeni capital of Sana’a. The target, Abu Ali al-Harithi, Al
Qaeda’s senior leader in Yemen and one of the planners of the
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.6 The collateral damage
included an American citizen, Kamal Derwish, who was reported
to be the leader of an Al Qaeda cell operating in Lackawanna, New
York. Although the drones had been used before to target and kill
enemy combatants, the strike against al-Harithi was the first one
conducted outside of Afghanistan, the well-recognized zone of
hostilities after 9/11. The United Nations Commission on Human
Rights (“UNCHR”) called the killing of al-Harithi “a clear case of
extrajudicial killing,” terms the United States would hear repeated
numerous times over the next decade.7 The al-Harithi strike was
also the first confirmed killing of an American citizen by a drone
strike, although it does not appear that the American was the target
but, rather, was “collateral” damage or, in intelligence parlance,
“incidental.”
Since 2002, drone strikes have been used frequently outside
of Afghanistan. There have been a number of high-profile killings
of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders outside of Afghanistan, including
the May 2005 killing of Haitham al-Yemeni and August 2009
killing of Baitullah Mehsud, both in Pakistan.8 The legality of the
drone strikes outside of Afghanistan has been questioned by some
5

See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 101 (2002); see also Jane Mayer,
The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009.
6
David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for
Suspects; Fatal Strike In Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-suspectsfatal-strike-yemen-was-based-rules-set-bush.html.
7
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶¶ 37–39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/003/3 (Jan. 13,
2003) (by Asma Jahangir), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/annual.htm.
8
Douglas Jehl, Remotely Controlled Craft Part of U.S.-Pakistan Drive
Against Al Qaeda, Ex-Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A12,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/politics/16qaeda.html.
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who argue that any killings outside the zone of armed conflict,
Afghanistan, would constitute illegal killings in violation of the
victims’ human rights.9 Since 9/11, drone strikes have been
carried out in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia
by both the CIA and the U.S. military, sometimes separately and at
other times as joint operations. The recent terrorist attack against
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012,
which killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three
other Americans, has raised the issue of whether the CIA will
begin using armed drones in North Africa targeting the Al Qaeda
affiliate group known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.10 The
group has been linked to the attack and has declared its intention to
attack U.S. targets. North Africa may be the next region where the
drone program could be employed.
Since the incidental killing of Derwish in 2002, the United
States has confirmed that armed drones killed an American citizen,
Anwar al-Awlaki, an American Muslim cleric who helped plan a
number of terrorist plots, including the December 2009 attempt to
blow up a jetliner headed to Detroit. Al-Awlaki had served as a
recruiter for Al Qaeda and had links to Major Nidal Hasan, who
attacked fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009. In
September 2011, the CIA targeted and killed al-Awlaki while he
was traveling in Yemen. This was the first time since killing
Hairithi in Yemen in 2002 that the CIA conducted a drone targeted
killing inside Yemen. The case of Awlaki and other similar cases
since 9/11 highlight that Al Qaeda remains a lethal enemy of the
United States, especially given its ability to find sanctuary in other
territories. As specific Al Qaeda members have been successfully
eliminated, the group has come to rely on affiliate organizations
dispersed across several continents (Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, al-Shabab in Somalia, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, the
9

Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 2–4 (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, Notre Dame
Law Sch., July 2010).
10
Greg Miller, CIA Seeks to Expand Drone Fleet, Officials Say,” WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/cia-seeks-to-expand-drone-fleet-officials-say/2012/10/18/01149a8c1949-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
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Haqqani network in Pakistan, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).
These affiliates are now the extension of Al Qaeda operating under
the same goals and mission. They provide financial, technical, and
logistical support functions to those local franchises of Al Qaeda in
different countries. On September 30, 2011, President Obama
publicity identified al-Awlaki as “the leader of external operations
for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” He had played a
significant role in an attack conducted by Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian Muslim who attempted to blow up a
Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit on Christmas Day
2009.11 Al-Awlaki’s work for Al Qaeda started with just
encouraging terrorist activities against the United States but he
then transitioned to “acting for or on behalf of Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula . . . and providing financial, material or
technical support for . . . acts of terrorism.”12 He had become a
belligerent and, according to U.S. officials, a legitimate target.
Also killed in the drone strike was Samir Khan, publisher of the
Inspire, and an American citizen who was not on the target list but
was traveling with al-Awlaki.
The targeting of al-Awlaki, an American citizen, caused a
significant level of concern among U.S. government officials about
the legality of the president authorizing the killing of an American
citizen in secret and without the benefit of a trial. In response to
concerns raised, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
was asked to draft a special memorandum justifying the killing and
providing a legal rationale for targeting an American.13 According
to the New York Times, the memo asserted that the targeted killing
of al-Awlaki would not violate the U.S. Constitution, Executive
Order 12333 and its ban on assassinations, any U.S. criminal
11

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469) (quoting Michael
Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Sept. 22, 2010).
12
Designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi [as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist] pursuant to Exec. Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010).
13
Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at 1.
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statute on murder, or international law.14 According to the article,
the administration had determined that since al-Awlaki’s capture
was not feasible and Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling
to prevent his participation in activities that posed a threat to the
United States, the killing of al-Awlaki was necessary and lawful.15
On March 5, 2012, in a speech at Northwestern University
School of Law, Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated the
“unwilling or unable” test as he described that targeted killings in
other countries would be legal if the host State “is unable or
unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.”16
In addressing the issue of targeting U.S. citizens, Holder outlined
the circumstances under which lethal force would be lawful, to
include the criteria that the individual was 1) a senior operational
leader of a group the United States was engaged in armed conflict
with, and 2) actively engaged in planning to kill Americans.
Notably, also included in this list of factors was the requirement
that the U.S. citizen posed “an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States,” an element not traditionally required for
legitimate targets under the laws of armed conflict.17
This was not the first time that the United States has
articulated the “unwilling or unable” test to justify actions in
another State’s territory without the State’s consent. The United
States has articulated the same test in uses of force in addition to
14

Id.
Id.
16
Attorney General Eric Holder, Speech at Northwestern University
School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/2012/text-of-the-attorney-generalsnational-security-speech/#more-6236.
17
Id. It is interesting to note that under jus in bello principles in
international law, there is no requirement to make individual determinations
about targets that involve an imminent threat. Furthermore, under jus ad bellum,
according to the Caroline precedent (addressed below), the imminent criteria is
only necessary when acting in self-defense when the host State is actually
willing to cooperate in deterring the threat but the threatened State determines
that it must act swiftly without the host State’s assistance in preventing a threat
from materializing. It is not clear why the U.S. administration has added an
additional element of “imminence” for targeting U.S. citizens.
15
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the use of drones. In 2008, as President Obama was campaigning
for the presidential election, in addressing how he would address
the terrorist threat emerging from Pakistan, he stated, “[I]f we have
actionable intelligence against bin Laden or other key Al Qaeda
officials . . . and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against
them, we should.”18 In May 2010, with President Obama in the
Oval Office, the United States did just that. By President Obama’s
order, U.S. Navy Seals entered Pakistan, with the government’s
consent, and killed Osama bin Laden. The implication from the
U.S. action was that the United States had determined that Pakistan
was either unable or unwilling to deal with Osama bin Laden (stop
him from planning further attacks on the United States).
Therefore, the United States would address the threat even if that
meant violating Pakistan’s sovereignty.
President Obama referenced an “unwilling or unable”
standard in using force within Pakistan for the operation against
Osama bin Laden. Other States agree that a standard like the
“unwilling or unable” test is the appropriate standard to assess the
legality of the use of force under the circumstances.19 Many
commentators have debated whether the U.S. operation in this case
was lawful under international law. Unfortunately, international
law currently gives States like the United States that are suffering
from ongoing attacks from non-state actors little direction about
what factors are relevant under the law when making these
decisions.
A year after killing Osama Bin Laden, the Obama
administration, for the first time, acknowledged the U.S. covert
program using drones to kill terrorists. In a speech at the
Woodrow Wilson Center, John Brennan, the President’s
18

Andy Merten, Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, MSNBC, Feb.
28, 2008.
19
U.N. Security Council, 36th Sess., 2292nd mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2292 (July 17, 1981) (Israel invoking the “unwilling or unable” standard
in justifying its use of force in Lebanon against Hezbollah); U.N. Doc.
S/1996/479 (July 2, 1996) (in a letter from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Turkey invokes the “unwilling or unable” test to defend its use of force in Iraq
against the Kurdish Workers’ Party).
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counterterrorism advisor at the White House, provided the first
official disclosure of the secret program, discussing the legal
standard for the targeted killings.20 Brennan stated the president
has general constitutional authority as commander in chief to act
against “any imminent threat of attack” and a specific
congressional mandate to strike any member of Al Qaeda under the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. But with Al Qaeda
members, Brennan goes on, “when considering lethal force we ask
whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. interests.”
Except when the Al Qaeda member is a U.S. citizen; then the
standard narrows to “whether the individual poses an imminent
threat of violent attack.” It seems that Brennan drew a distinction
between a lower threshold for designating a foreign member of Al
Qaeda a lawful target, a determination by the U.S. government that
the individual is a “significant threat” and a higher threshold for
American citizens who are members of Al Qaeda to become a
target, a determination that the American poses an imminent threat
of violent attack.
Brennan also discussed the issue of international legal
authority. Invoking the same “unable or unwilling” language that
President Obama had previously used, Brennan argued that based
on the self-defense principle of international law, the drone attacks
into another State’s sovereignty territory are legal, “at least when
the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take
action against the threat.”21 In addition to Pakistan not providing
its consent to the United States to kill Osama bin Laden within
Pakistan, there is evidence that Pakistan has also objected to the
U.S. use of drones to conduct targeted killings within Pakistan.
20

John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars: Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr.
30, 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-andethics-U.S.-counterterrorism-strategy.
21
Id. See also John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School’s Program on
Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security By Adhering To Our Values And
Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adheringour-values-an.
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Reading between the lines of the administration’s statements, its
legal argument for lawful strikes within Pakistan, even without
consent, is based on the idea that if a State is unable or unwilling to
stop its territory from being used by individuals cause harm to the
United States, then the United States will act to eliminate the threat
based upon its right of self-defense. In other words, while the
United States will not hold the government of Pakistan responsible
necessarily (i.e., the United States is not attacking elements of the
Pakistan government but only the terrorist target), it will invoke its
right of self-defense to prevent or stop the threat, even if it means
violating the sovereignty of Pakistan.
Understanding the basis of such tests under international
law is important to assessing the legality and legitimacy of State
actions. This article will review the international law related to the
use of force, looking to relevant factors such as treaty law,
decisions of international courts and the opinions of legal scholars
in discussing the legality of the use of force. First, however, the
next section will examine the use of drones under U.S. domestic
law.
II. U.S. DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Some critics of the U.S. drone program have argued that
the Bush and Obama administrations use of armed drones to kill
specific individuals violates domestic law. They have challenged
the authorities of specific agencies conducting the targeted killings
as well as the overall presidential authorities to kill individuals
without affording them trials. The legal authorities of U.S.
military and intelligence agencies to use drones to target and kill
terrorists starts with the presidential executive and commander-inchief powers, delineated in the U.S. Constitution and applicable
federal statutes, and delegated to the Secretary of Defense under
his authorities pursuant to Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the
Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (“DCIA”) pursuant to their authorities
as outlined in Title 50 of the U.S. Code.
The U.S. President’s authority to direct military and
intelligence activities against foreign threats resides in his

30
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constitutional executive and commander-in-chief powers.22 As the
Supreme Court noted in the Curtiss-Wright case, the president is
vested with significant executive power and is the “sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations—a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress.”23 The dispute in the Curtiss-Wright case was whether
President Roosevelt had independent authority to restrict private
companies in shipping arms overseas because the president
deemed such sales to be threatening to U.S. national security. In
finding that the president was acting under his constitutionally
provided powers of commander-in-chief in that case, the Court
ruled that the president did not need congressional permission to
restrict such shipments, as he was carrying out his responsibility to
defend the nation from foreign threats.24
Similarly, the Court has found that the president’s
commander-in-chief constitutional authorities authorize him “to
employ secret agents to enter rebel lines and obtain information
respecting the strengths, resources, and movements of the
enemy.”25
As recognized by those that drafted the U.S.
Constitution, the president has the authority to “manage the
business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may
dictate.”26 While some disagree as to how such powers are to be
shared between Congress and the Executive Branch, no one
disputes the president’s authority to use both military and
intelligence measures to repel attacks against the nation.27
Certainly, if the country is at risk of attack, actual or anticipated,
the president, through those authorities vested to him in the U.S.
Constitution has the authority to act in defense of the nation in
accordance with the relevant domestic and international laws.
22

U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
24
Id.
25
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876).
26
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
27
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH, 3-5 (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL
WAR POWERS 3–12 (1995); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY
80–84 (1990); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74–77 (1990).
23
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As commander-in-chief, the president can exercise his
authority through any agency or department that he believes will
be most effective in defending the nation, as long as such action is
also in accordance with statutory enactments by Congress. Title
10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code are the relevant U.S. statutes
outlining the president’s authority to use the military and/or
intelligence agencies to employ force against threats. Under Title
10, the secretary of defense is the president’s “principal assistant . .
. in all matters relating to the U.S. Department of Defense
(“DoD”).”28 This statute provides to the secretary of defense the
“authority, direction and control” over the DoD, to include all
agencies and commands within the department.29 Title 50 of the
U.S. Code incorporates the National Security Act of 1947 which
established the National Security Council (“NSC”), the CIA, as
well as other agencies, and codified the process for national
security decision-making and congressional oversight of
intelligence activities.30 In addition to creating specific national
security agencies, Title 50 establishes, defines and delineates the
authorities within the intelligence community.31 As contrasted
with the DoD’s war-fighting authorities under Title 10, CIA’s
covert action authorities are derived from Title 50, to be discussed
later in this article.
Title 10 and Title 50 statutes are mutually-reinforcing
authorities in that nothing within the statutes prohibits the DoD
elements from carrying out activities under Title 50 authorities
(i.e., the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden) and nothing within the
statutes prohibits intelligence elements from operating under Title
50 authorities. During the May 2011 U.S. operation against Bin
Laden in Pakistan, for example, U.S. military assets, Navy Seals,
executed the operation, but they did so under the authority of the
then-DCIA Leon Panetta. Director Panetta was operating under
28

10 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2006).
Id.
30
50 U.S.C. § 1-2420 (2006).
31
50 U.S.C. § 403-5 (2006). The National Geo-Spatial Agency (“NGA”)
and the National Reconnaissance Office (“NRO”) are also intelligence agencies
that are part of DoD.
29
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his authorities as delegated by the president and pursuant to the
National Security Act of 1947 to conduct covert action. Notably,
operational responsibility for conducting covert action remains
with the CIA and not the DNI. In accordance with the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”),
legislation that reorganized the intelligence community in the
aftermath of 9/11, the DCIA reports to the DNI, but the DNI does
not have operational control over the CIA.32 The vague language
within the statute has caused some tension between the DNI and
the DCIA related to operational matters and the line between their
authorities. There had been disagreements over the respective
roles of the DNI and DCIA related to covert action that were
ultimately resolved by the National Security Council. The
resolution was that the CIA would remain in charge of covert
action and the right to select chiefs of stations and the DNI was
given a role in assessing and evaluating covert action when
requested by the president or the NSC.
Much of the debate and concern over the conflating of the
two statutory authorities within Title 10 and Title 50 has to do with
congressional oversight and reporting requirements. Some have
argued that by calling some activities “preparation of the
environment,” under its Title 10 authorities, DoD avoids reporting
those activities to the congressional oversight committees that
would otherwise be informed of such activities if conducted by
CIA under its Title 50 authorities.33 There are, however, important
implications related to oversight, especially when the government
is engaged in authorizing the killing of American citizens. It is
important to ensure that appropriate transparency exists related to
the president’s actions in the name of national defense.
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Oversight over DoD activities is conducted by both the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, which exercise
jurisdiction over all aspects of DoD and matters relating to “the
common defense.”34 As for congressional oversight of intelligence
activities, the National Security Act of 1947 originally did not
include any congressional oversight provisions and any oversight
at the time that was conducted was done in an informal and
minimal fashion. This approach to intelligence oversight changed
radically after the Church and Pike Committees conducted their
investigations in the early 1970s over allegations of domestic
spying and assassinations plots by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (“FBI”), the NSA and the CIA. Ultimately, in 1980,
Congress passed the Intelligence Oversight Act, as part of the
Intelligence Authorization statute for 1981, requiring the thenDCIA to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities.”35 Today, the
intelligence committees exercise broad oversight of the
intelligence community.
In the context of the drone programs, whether the military
or the intelligence agencies are conducting the strikes,
administration officials have publicly stated that they are keeping
Congress informed of the counterterrorism operations. In his
speech at Northwestern School of Law in March of 2012, Attorney
General Holder, in addressing the issue of the United States
targeting a U.S. citizen, Holder noted that the U.S. Constitution
does not require the president to get permission from a court before
targeting a U.S. citizen who is engaged in a conflict against the
United States but also noted,
[I]n keeping with the law and our constitutional
system of checks and balances, the Executive
Branch regularly informs the appropriate members
of Congress about our counterterrorism activities,
34
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including the legal framework, and would of course
follow the same practice where lethal force is used
against United States citizens.

A. Covert Action
Covert action is defined in the National Security Act of
1947 as “[a]n activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”36 In 1974,
Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act, mandating that the president make specific
findings regarding covert actions, providing Congress with
notification of the covert actions that the president authorized.37
The president must sign an order approving the operation, based on
the president’s finding that covert action is “necessary to support
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, and is
important to the national security of the United States” and
specifying the U.S. departments, agencies, or entities and any third
parties not elements or agents of the U.S. government who are
authorized “to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way
in the covert action.”38 The Church Committee’s final report
concluded that a presidential finding for each covert operation
stating the operations were “important to the national security of
the United States” was sufficient to ensure constraint in the use of
covert actions. The report stated, “covert action must be seen as an
exceptional act, to be undertaken only when the national security
requires it and when over means will not suffice.”39
In 1980, as part of the Intelligence Oversight Act, Congress
imposed procedural requirements on the intelligence community
36
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for reporting activities to Congress.40 This statute required the
president to keep the intelligence communities “fully and currently
informed” of “significant anticipated intelligence activit[ies],”
allowing the president to limit notification under “extraordinary
circumstances.”41 With the congressional statutes that were passed
during the 1980s and 1990s, Congress ended the practice of
plausible denial for the president in conducting intelligence
activities, at least as related to Congress.
The reporting
requirements continue today and ensure that Congress has a role in
reviewing all targeted killings whether they are described as covert
actions or significant intelligence activities. In sum, the legal
authority to conduct covert action resides in the Executive Branch,
with congressional oversight and formal presidential approval of
all covert programs.
Shortly after 9/11, President Bush signed a covert action
authorizing the use of lethal force against Osama Bin Laden and
others responsible for the attacks.42 In intelligence parlance, this
document is called a “lethal finding.” In 2010, a limited number of
congressional leaders were informed about the Bin Laden mission
prior to its execution. Previously, presidents had signed similar
findings targeting specific individuals. It was reported that
President Reagan signed a secret presidential finding authorizing
the use of lethal force to kill Gaddafi prior to the United States
bombing of his headquarters in Libya in 1984.43 By the end of
1998, President Clinton had expanded his previous authorization to
the CIA, allowing CIA tribal partners in Afghanistan to kill Bin
Laden.44
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The Obama administration has not officially confirmed that
the CIA is conducting drone strikes against terrorists under covert
action authorities. However, in February 2011, John A. Rizzo,
former CIA Acting General Counsel, who served as the most
senior lawyer at the CIA and retired in 2009, discussed the CIA
covert action drone program in an interview with Newsweek. He
explained how he personally “concurred” on authorizations for
drone strikes against specific targets, signing “about one cable each
month.”45
Rizzo is currently under investigation by the
Department of Justice for the unauthorized disclosure of CIA’s
secret drone program based on the details he discussed in the
interview.46 More recently, on April 10, 2012, while not
confirming the CIA’s role in the drone program, Stephen W.
Preston, General Counsel of the CIA, spoke at Harvard Law
School, discussing CIA and the Rule of Law.47 In his speech,
Preston noted that CIA activities must comport with “covert action
procedures of the National Security Act of 1947, such that
Congress is properly notified by means of a Presidential Finding.”
He further mentioned that depending on the specific activities,
“international law principles may be applicable” including the right
of self-defense and rules related to armed conflict. The CIA drone
program as described would be categorized as a covert operation
and would therefore have presidential authorization under U.S.
domestic legal requirements. The president, however, would not
necessarily be knowledgeable about the identity of any specific
individual on the CIA’s target list. Furthermore, certain members
of Congress would be notified about the program. What is less
clear is the level of detail that is provided to the members of
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Congress and whether the Congress would be legally entitled to
obtaining such details (i.e., do they get access to CIA’s target list).
B. E.O. 12333: Assassinations v. Targeted Killings
In 1975, Congress established the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (“Church Committee”) to investigate allegations that the
CIA had exceeded its charter. The committee found that the CIA,
at the direction of the White House, had been involved in several
assassination plots in the 1960s and 1970s, the most famous one
against Fidel Castro.48 There were other plots targeting Patrice
Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, General Rene Schneider of Chile, and Ngo Dinh Diem
of South Vietnam.49 In its final report, the Church Committee
stated, “We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of
American policy.”50 Since 1976, the United States has formally
banned the use of assassinations, either directly by the United
States or by third parties.
In 1976, not wanting a legislative enactment that would
impinge upon the president’s constitutional authorities as
commander-in-chief to carry out intelligence activities, Gerald R.
Ford issued Executive Order 11905 prohibiting assassinations as
well as setting forth a number of other rules and procedures for the
intelligence community to follow.51
Every president since
President Ford has signed the executive order maintaining the
assassination ban provision. The current version, Executive Order
12333, first signed by President Reagan in 1981 and most recently
updated in 2008, bans assassinations. It provides that “[n]o person
48
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employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”52
Executive Order 12333 and its predecessor orders do not define the
term “assassination.”53 However, given the context in which the
order was originally promulgated the ban has been understood to
apply to circumstances of killings of heads of state during a time of
peace.54
Tragically, prior to 9/11, not all U.S. officials agreed with
this interpretation of the executive order, cautioning that any
operation to target and kill Bin Laden (versus capture and try him
before a court) would potentially violate the executive order ban on
assassination.55 Throughout the 1990s, concerns about the legal
and political implications of targeting Bin Laden outside a selfdefense scenario prevented the CIA from taking action to eliminate
an enemy of the United States who would continue to wage an
effective war against the State. Certainly, President Ford and his
successors did not envision that by signing the executive order they
agreed that the United States was prohibited from acting in selfdefense against a foreign enemy who had already attacked the
country. The executive order exists to prevent the killing of
foreign political leaders like Fidel Castro, not terrorist leaders. The
intent of the drafters was that the order applied during times of
peace when the United States was not engaged in hostilities that
had been authorized by Congress or in accordance with the
international legal right of self-defense.56
C. Congressional Action Related to U.S. Drones Program
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Under U.S. domestic law, the use of drones targeted against
those terrorists that conducted the 9/11 attacks and those that
harbor or support those individuals has authorization in the form of
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)
which continues to be effective, controlling legal authority.57 The
preamble of the AUMF invokes the right of self-defense and
authorized the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any further acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons.58
The AUMF authorized the U.S. President to use force against all
those involved in the attacks on 9/11, whether they were the
leaders of Al Qaeda or mere foot soldiers, foreign officials or
private individuals. Under the president’s constitutional authorities,
he has the authority to determine which agency of the United
States Government would be the most appropriate in using force to
stop those that conducted 9/11. It is up to the president to
determine whether the DoD or the CIA is best equipped to carry
the mission out. In fact, both DoD and CIA have been critical to
the drone program and stopping the terrorists from being able to
carry out further attacks.
The limiting authority of the AUMF, however, derives
from the nexus between the September 11, 2001 attacks against the
U.S. and the involvement of the target for lethal killings with those
attacks against the United States. If the nexus exists, then the
AUMF would authorize the action against the target. For those
terrorists like al-Awlaki who are members of Al Qaeda in the
57
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Arabian Pennisula (“AQAP”), the Haqqani Network in Pakistan or
the Pakistan Taliban who have been killed by the drones, but who
were not directly involved with the attacks of 9/11, the AUMF
does not cover them explicitly. However, under a co-belligerency
theory, members of other terrorists groups like AQAP that have
made a common cause with Al Qaeda and have become “a part of
Al Qaeda— or at a minimum an organized, associated force or cobelligerent of Al Qaeda—in the non-international armed conflict
between the United States and Al Qaeda.”59 In February 2012, Jeh
Johnson, DoD General Counsel, in a speech at Yale Law School,
discussed the AUMF. He noted that although the AUMF does not
contain geographic limitations, the Obama Administration does not
consider the current hostilities against the terrorists that threaten
the United States to be a “global” war without limits. He also
noted that, in his opinion, the decisions related to who is targeted
in these hostilities is a core function of the Executive Branch and is
unreviewable by the courts.60 Arguably, even without specific
congressional approval such as the AUMF, the U.S. President
would have the legal authority to use drones against specific
targets since these strikes do not involve participation in
“hostilities” as understood by the War Powers Resolution.61
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Increasingly, the practice of international affairs is less
State-centered, while international law remains very much so.
Most international law pronouncements remain almost exclusively
directed to States as well as its implementation mechanisms. While
international law has long recognized the role of States in inter59
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state force and the laws related to the use of force between States,
it has been slow to develop in the area of force by non-state actors.
For decades prior to 9/11, States faced the rising threat from nonstate terrorist actors. The U.S. was one of a number of States that
had been the target of terrorists, suffering attacks against its
embassies, civilians, military personnel and its territory. As the
United Nations (“UN”) recognized in its high-level panel report in
2004, the “norms governing the use of force by non-state actors
have not kept pace with those pertaining to States.” 62 As the report
pleaded, the “United Nations must achieve the same degree of
normative strength concerning non-state use of force as it has
concerning State use of force.”63
In a world where non-state actors, terrorists, can hide
within the sovereign territory of a State and launch attacks against
other States, States currently lack effective international legal
guidance from the UN as to what should inform their decisions to
use force under the circumstances. There are, however, established
principles based in international law that can and should guide the
international community as all States seek to minimize the use of
force while providing security for all from terrorists. To deprive
States of the legal authority to act to stop and prevent terrorists
from acting would undermine the law of the Charter and the
international order established in the wake of world war. The UN
Charter was not drafted to leave states vulnerable to attack without
any recourse to defense.
Some have argued that the United States should be using
law enforcement methods to deal with Al Qaeda members in other
territories. What these critics miss, however, is that the threat from
Al Qaeda is not the same as law enforcement threats. In the past
the U.S. position was to generally treat acts of violence by
terrorists like other criminals and use law enforcements measure
against the individuals. For example, following the attacks by Al
62
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Qaeda on the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in East
Africa in 1998, and the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the United States used
criminal law and law enforcement measures to investigate,
extradite, and prosecute the persons responsible for the attacks.
The United States also, however, used military force and
intelligence measures to counter the terrorist threat during the same
time, maintaining the right of the United States to defend itself
against attacks from terrorists. For example, after Libyan agents
bombed a Berlin disco where American service personnel
frequented, the United States bombed the residence of the Libyan
leader, Gaddafi, in addition to other military and intelligence
targets. The United States argued that the attacks by Libyan agents
led to a right to use force in self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter.64
In 1998, after the attacks against the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, in addition sending the FBI to East Africa to
investigate the attack, the United States bombed Al Qaeda training
camps in Afghanistan and a nerve gas manufacturing facility with
ties to Osama Bin Laden in Sudan. These instances, however, can
be distinguished from the current conflict that the United States is
engaged in against terrorists. The terrorists in these cases were
localized and their level of violence was contained. Therefore, a
military response to such actions was limited to a specific a
discrete use of force in self-defense to eliminate the assets in the
locations that they were using to carry out attacks against the
United States. The violence at issue, then, was not articulated as
reaching the level of an armed conflict with these groups.
However, today, the terrorists continue to pose a threat with the
ability to create great violence against the United States as they
move across various national boarders.
64
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For criminals such as drug lords, human traffickers, arms
dealers, money launderers, the United States uses criminal law
enforcement measures and the international criminal legal regime,
working with other States, to stop such criminals. Al Qaeda, as the
UN recognized, poses a threat that is significantly different in
scope and scale from criminals. The attacks that Al Qaeda deploy
are of such large scale and continuity that they are distinguishable
from sporadic murders by criminals or low-level armed incursions
or border incidents. The stated goal of Al Qaeda is to commit
massive casualties specifically among a State’s civilian population.
Success for Al Qaeda does not come from low-level attacks but
from high profile attacks with large death counts and great
visibility. While Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups do commit
crimes to facilitate their terrorist activities (e.g., money laundering,
drug trafficking, arms dealing), the reason the United States uses
military force in self-defense against such groups is not because of
their criminal activity but for their actions that threaten the very
viability of States—high-level attacks of mass murder. The
legally-appropriate response in self-defense against the threats
from Al Qaeda is the use of force narrowly targeting the members
of Al Qaeda who pose the threat. As long as Al Qaeda has the
intent and capabilities to carry out attacks similar in nature to the
9/11 attacks, the threats persists and the right of self-defense
remains.
A. The Use of Inter-state Force in Self-defense: Jus ad Bellum
Targeted killings conducted in the territory of other States
raise sovereignty issues. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
States are forbidden from using force in the territory of another
State. When a State conducts a targeted killing in the territory of
another State with which it is not in armed conflict the questions of
whether the first State violates the sovereignty of the second State
is raised. The answer is based on the law applicable to the use of
inter-state force. In other words, in conducting the targeted killing,
did the State have the legal authority under the UN Charter to
violate the article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force within
another State? The legality of the targeted killing will depend on
the rules related to international humanitarian law.
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Under international law, a targeted killing conducted by
one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the
second State’s sovereignty if (1) the second State consents, (2) the
UN Security Council authorizes the targeted killing under Chapter
VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter, or (3) if the first State has the
right under international law to use force in self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 states that a State can use
force in another State’s territory, without violating that State’s
sovereignty, if the first State has suffered an armed attack. The
UN Security Council has supported two circumstances under
which the first State has such authority under Article 51: (1) where
the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the first
State,65 or (2) if the second State is unwilling or unable to stop
armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory.66
The “unwilling or unable” test is less developed under
international law and will likely need more development before it
is fully accepted by States. Some have argued that the right to
intervene in such cases where the State is unable or unwilling to
stop the threat stems from the obligation of neutrality during wars
between States.67 As the Caroline incident illustrated, even though
Canada and the United States were not at war, the British argued
that they were justified in using force in self-defense within the
United States because the United States had been unable to uphold
its responsibilities of a neutral State in preventing Americans from
interfering in Canadian matters (i.e., Americans joining the rebels
fighting against the Canadians and using an American ship to
supply the rebels).68 This issue will be examined more closely
below. However, during a time of peace, where an incursion or
threat does not amount to an “armed attack” the right may be an
65
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extension of the concept of the norm of State responsibility to
prevent harm from emanating from its territory and harming
another State.
As long as the force used is both necessary and
proportionate, States can use lethal force in self-defense within the
territory of another State in response to an armed attack.69
According to the principle of necessity, the State acting in selfdefense must only use force when it has deemed that no other nonlethal means exist to resolve the threat. Proportionality under jus
ad bellum requires that any response to an armed attack be
calibrated to stop the original attack or prevent future attacks.
Although no strict force-to-force ratio is required, in determining
how the response is proportionate to the original attack the
following factors should be considered: the scale of the response,
the targets chosen, type and degree of force employed, and the
results to be achieved. In responding to non-state actors who have
committed an attack in another territory, a responding State would
be limited to acts in self-defense targeted against the terrorist
targets as contrasted to the infrastructure, facilities, and leadership
of the territorial State, unless there was proof of the State’s
complicity in the terrorists attacks.70
1. Consent
It is clear under international law that if a State invites or
consents to another State’s using force within its territory, there is
no violation of the State’s sovereignty or Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter. This is a well-established exception to the Article 2(4)
prohibition. As far as drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen are
concerned, based upon public reports, it is likely that those States
did provide consent to the United States to conduct targeted
killings within their territories. However, international law still
places limits upon what can be done against specific individuals
within a State’s territory since the host State itself is limited under
69
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international humanitarian law or human rights law as to what it
can do vis-a-vis individuals within its territory. Under a law
enforcement framework, controlled by human rights law, a State
cannot target to kill individuals in its own territory unless there is
no other way to avert a great danger. If, however, the host State is
unable to detain and arrest the individual, preventing the person
from posing a threat against the other State by planning and taking
part in terrorist attacks, the host State may legally consent to the
other State using force within its territory to stop the threat.
2. Right of Self-defense Against Non-state Actors
In the absence of consent by the host State, the first State
can legally use force within the host State against specific terrorists
based on the principle of self-defense.71 As noted previously,
according to the UN Charter and the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”), international law permits the use of lethal force in selfdefense in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is
necessary and proportionate. There has been disagreement,
however, as to whether the right of self-defense applies to the use
of force against non-state actors and, related, whether the principle
of self-defense alone can justify targeted killings.
The United States’ use of force in Afghanistan after 9/11
was based on the international legal principle of self-defense. The
principle of state responsibility also played a role in the U.S.
response against Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of the attacks, in the
sovereign State of Afghanistan, where the Taliban was tied to the
acts of Al Qaeda and had been at least unable, if not unwilling, to
stop Al Qaeda from operating within its territory against the United
States. This right of self-defense stems from the customary legal
“inherent” right of all States to act in self-defense in the face of
significant threats. The resort to legal force by the United States
after 9/11 targeting Al Qaeda was based on the right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 permits the
use of lethal force on the territory of another State if that State is
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responsible for an armed attack. It has been a matter of debate
whether Article 51 permits States to use force against non-state
actors who committed “armed attacks” against the State.
The ICJ in the Wall opinion and the Nicaragua case lends
support to the argument that States cannot invoke Article 51
against armed attacks by non-state actors that are not imputable to
the State. The ICJ has ruled that force used in self-defense may
only be carried out on the territory of a State responsible for a
significant armed attack if that State ordered the attack or controls
the group that carried it out.72 The United States has argued that
Article 51 was not intended to replace the pre-existing customary
international right to act in self-defense, including against nonstate actors. In fact, State practice supports this argument. The
Caroline incident of 1837 reflects the customary international right
to act in self-defense that existed prior to the UN Charter and, most
experts argue, continues to exist post-UN Charter.
3. The Caroline Incident Revisited
It was the Caroline case that changed the concept of selfdefense from what had been previously considered to be a political
excuse to what has since been accepted as a legal doctrine under
international law. In 1837, Canada was deeply immersed in a
rebellion. The U.S. government did not support the rebels and had
maintained that it had been trying to take steps to maintain order
along the border with Canada and restrain American cooperation
with the rebels. The efforts by the U.S. government, however,
failed to stop hundreds of Americans from joining the rebels. The
specific facts of the Caroline case are particularly relevant to
today’s current conflict between the United States and terrorists
and the legal justifications offered by the United States.
On December 13, 1837, an armed group, composed mainly
of Americans citizens, invaded Canadian territory and took
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possession of Navy Island, a British “possession.”73 An American
named Van Rausselear, led the group. From December 13 to 29,
1837, the group maintained control of Navy Island, committing
“acts of Warlike aggression on the Canadian shore, and also on
British Boats passing the Island.”74 On December 29, 1837, the
Caroline, an American private ship, traveled from Buffalo, New
York, to Navy Island, transporting men and “stores of war.” On
December 29, 1837, a British force destroyed the Caroline,
seeking to stop the supply of men and supplies to the rebels and
preventing the Americans their access to the mainland of Canada.
At midnight of that evening, the British moved into U.S. territory
as it attacked the ship, killing two Americans, destroying the ship,
and arresting two individuals (one an American citizen). Prior to
the attack against the Caroline, the U.S. officials were aware that
Americans were actively participating in the rebellion against the
Canadians. The United States, however, had not arrested any
Americans nor had the United States agreed to extradite anyone to
Canada to be tried for their actions.
On January 5, 1838, Secretary of State Forsyth wrote a
letter of protest to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington.
Mr. Fox replied. He described the nature of the Caroline as
“piratical” and invoked the “necessity of self-defense and selfpreservation” as justification for the destruction of the Caroline.
Notably, the British maintained in the letter that because the
United States had failed to enforce its own laws preventing the
Americans from joining the rebels and attacking Canada, the
British were justified in destroying the Caroline. The ship had
acted as a belligerent, forfeiting any privileges of neutral territory.
As to the British claim that the United States failed to enforce its
laws, there were facts supporting the claim. In a letter to the
president from the Mayor of Buffalo, the mayor wrote, “The civil
authorities have no adequate force to control these men, and unless
the General Government should interfere, there is no way to
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prevent serous disturbances.”75 The U.S. government did not send
any armed reinforcements to the border.
The United States and the British agreed that there was a
right to intervene into the territory of another State to stop and
prevent non-state actors from doing harm within the other territory
when necessary under the circumstances. The difference between
them, however, was over the claim by the British that the United
States was either unable or unwilling to stop the rebels within its
territory from attacking Canada. In their correspondence, the
ministers from Britain seemed to indicate that they thought that
this fact alone was sufficient to justify the destruction of the
Caroline. The United States insisted that it was adequately
fulfilling its obligation to prevent the rebels from attacking Canada
from U.S. territory. The facts revealed that the United States had
inadequately addressed the issue, as attacks into Canada from U.S.
territory continued throughout 1838.
It was not until 1841 when the then-Secretary of State
Daniel Webster wrote his famous letter to the British Minister Fox
containing the famous words justifying the destruction of Caroline
on “self-defence and self-preservation.” Webster called on the
British Government to show a “necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.” Webster went on to state that even if necessity
required the British to enter U.S. territory, they still needed to
show how their actions were not “unreasonable or excessive.”
Lord Ashburton, in his reply to Webster, fitting the facts into the
framework that Webster had developed, argued that because the
insurgent forces were organized in U.S. territory without effective
steps taken by the U.S. authorities to prevent them, it became
necessary to acquire the Caroline. Accordingly, if the State had
been willing and able to take steps to stop the threat, the State
acting in self-defense would have to show the necessity of acting
quickly under the circumstances. But if a State was not taking any
steps to stop the threat, the State acting in self-defense was
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justified in using force in the other State’s territory as long as the
actions in self-defense were proportionate to the threat.
According to the British, who believed that the United
States had been unwilling or unable to stop the attacks from U.S.
territory, the United States had failed to maintain a neutral and
peaceful status.76 In the view of the British, the British action
within U.S. territory was necessary because the United States was
not able or willing to stop the attacks. Therefore, there were not
any other measures that could have been taken in order to stop the
Caroline from providing the supplies to the rebels because the
United States has already proved unable stop these activities on the
border.
The U.S. position, on the other hand, articulated by
Webster’s formulation for determining the legality of self-defense,
was based on his assumption that the attack was unnecessary
because the United States was both willing able to satisfy its
obligations to prevent and punish attacks from within its borders.
Based on Webster’s assumption that the United States would be
able to stop the attacks, the British would have authority to use
force within U.S. territory against the rebels if the need to act was
“instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation.” In effect, Webster was arguing that the
British should have relied on the U.S. government to take action
against the rebels within U.S. territory. On the assumption that the
United States would and could stop the attacks from the rebels, the
threat posed by the Caroline was not so imminent that it required
the British to violate U.S. territory.
The Caroline incident, in full context and with a closer
look at the facts, makes clear that Webster’s rule was meant to
apply to situations in which the State on whose territory the selfdefense action is contemplated is not responsible for the threat
involved and is both able and willing to act appropriately to
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prevent the threat from being realized. In other words, the threat
must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation” before using force when the State is
able or willing to act to prevent the threat. Therefore, if the State
ably and willingly can take action against the threat, the State
contemplating using force would need to meet the higher threshold
of immediacy before taking such action under the circumstances.
The Caroline incident provides support for the argument that a
State can act in self-defense within the territory of another State
against non-State actors under certain circumstances. If the host
State is unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks from the nonstate actors then the first State acting in self-defense can use force
without having to meet the high threshold of a State of imminence.
Further support for the argument that States can use force
in self-defense against non-State actors is based on UN Security
Council (“UNSC”) resolutions 1368 and 1373, issued after 9/11
and NATO’s invocation of its Article 5 collective self-defense
provision in the wake of those attacks. In the weeks after 9/11, in
Resolution 1368, the UN Security Council recognized the 9/11
attacks as a major attack against a State and authorized the use of
lethal force against those responsible for the attacks. In the
resolution, however, the Security Council did not specify or limit
the particular location or State in which the United States could
legally use force in self-defense. Based on the Security Council
action and Article 51 authority, the United States had the legal
authority to use lethal force in the territory of another State against
the non-state actors who carried out the attacks on 9/11.
Even before the UNSC authorized this action, the United
States arguably had this “inherent” right under Article 51. But
certainly once the UNSC authorized a military response, there was
no doubt in the international community of the legal right of the
United States to use military force to stop the non-state actors who
conducted the attacks against the United States. Certainly, not
every wrongful act against a State will rise to the level of an armed
attack. But as long as the high threshold for an armed attack as set
forth by the Nicaragua case, “the most grave uses of forces,” is
met, then States have that right to use self-defense. Particularly
with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, with their global reach and
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support systems, these non-state actors may continue, without
engaging the responsibility of a host State, to conduct the kind of
armed attack that gives rise to the right to use force. As the
Caroline criteria pointed out, if a State is unwilling or unable to
stop terrorists from within its territory from carrying out armed
attacks against another States, the victim State has the legal
authority to use force within the host State against the terrorists,
but not the government. As long as terrorists groups continue to
actively plan and carry out attacks, the United States and other
States maintain the legal right to use lethal force in self-defense
against those groups, wherever they be. Furthermore, the right of
self-defense is a continuing self-defense right as distinguished
from an anticipatory self-defense right.77
4. The Threshold for Armed Attack by Non-state Actors
The ICJ has established a high threshold for the kinds of
attacks that would justify the use of force in self-defense in another
State’s territory. According to the ICJ, sporadic, low-intensity
attacks do not rise to the level of armed attack that would permit
the right to use such force in self-defense. Some commentators
have argued that in assessing the legality of the self-defense force
in light of the gravity of the attack, the force used must be judged
in light of each armed attack, looked at individually, rather than
considering the aggregation of the successive armed attacks.
However, the U.S. use of the targeted killings is based on an
assessment of the ongoing and continuous threat from these actors
who are part of groups that are actively planning to carry out
devastating attacks against the United States and U.S. interests
abroad.
Some have argued that the right of self-defense from an
armed attack does not last indefinitely, allowing a State to continue
endlessly to use force, but the right must stop at some point after
the armed attack. However, what if the State suffered from
continuous, ongoing attacks, separated by some time but that are
77
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still being planned by the adversary? One can argue that after
9/11, the United States had the legal authority to use force in selfdefense after the armed attack against its territory. And as argued
above, one can argue that that right extended to using force in
another State’s territory if that State was unable or unwilling to
stop that attacks from its territory. Even if a jus ad bellum analysis
offers a justification for a targeted killing, it does not dispose of the
further question of whether the killing of the particular individual
is lawful.
This question is answered by addressing the
requirements of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during
armed conflict.
Whether recourse to the use of force is legal is a question
that arises at the start of a conflict. To assess the legality of that
initial use of force, one turns to the UN Charter in analyzing
whether the use of force violated Article 2(4), whether the use of
force falls below the threshold of Article 2(4), and whether the use
of force triggered the Article 51 threshold for an “armed attack.”
This body of law is referred to as jus ad bellum. Even if a State
has the right to respond using lethal force in self-defense under
Article 51, however, there are limits to what a State can do in selfdefense. The general principle of necessity requires that a State
show that the use of military force is a last resort and can
accomplish a defensive purpose. In territories where the terrorists
are planning their attacks, where the host State cannot effectively
stop them, military force may be the last resort.
The principle of necessity requires that states use military
force as a last resort and in doing so can accomplish their defensive
purpose. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States, in
cooperation with dozens of states, tried to stop and prevent terrorist
attacks from Al Qaeda through law enforcement measures. At the
time, that was probably the most appropriate measure to take.
(Although one can dispute whether after the embassy bombings in
1998 or the attack against the U.S.S. Cole these measures should
have been subject to more doubt in their effectiveness to deal with
the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda). For decades, the United States
had worked with the criminal courts and partner law enforcement
agencies domestically and across the globe to obtain arrest
warrants for terrorists to seek trying them for their crimes. The
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hope was that such measures would take the most dangerous
terrorists off the street and prevent the terrorists from conducting
significant attacks.
After 9/11, the international community supported the U.S.
use of military force against Al Qaeda in recognition of the fact
that military force was necessary to deter the terrorist threat and
that the law enforcement approach that had been used prior to 9/11
in the face of attacks since the early 1990s from Al Qaeda were not
effective. Certainly, in authorizing such use of force, the UNSC
believes that such use of force could accomplish the defensive
purpose of preventing Al Qaeda from attacking again. At least that
was the goal. The use of drones to kill members of Al Qaeda,
taking them off the streets and rendering them unable to plan or
carry out another attack, would satisfy the necessity requirement.
Just as bombing Afghanistan fulfilled the requirement, so too does
eliminating those members of Al Qaeda that would facilitate
further attacks meet the necessity requirement under international
law. CIA Director Leon Panetta has stated that drones are “the
only game in town in terms of confronting and trying to disrupt the
Al Qaeda leadership.”78 According to Panetta, the person who
authorizes the targeted killing of Al Qaeda members, this advanced
technology may be the only means to stop Al Qaeda and prevent
further attacks.
Some have criticized the use of drones, arguing that it is not
an effective counterterrorism tool because at times innocent bystanders are killed.79 While the likelihood of innocent people
being killed in warfare is always a possibility, the fact that there
are incidental deaths of civilians not posing a threat during a drone
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strike does not make the use of strikes illegal. As always with the
use of force, the State must abide by the requirement that the use of
force must be proportionate to the threat, causing as little death or
damage to bystanders as possible to achieve the military objective.
The decision to use any military weapon as a lawful use of force in
self-defense must be weighed against the requirement to minimize
the death of innocent civilians. This decision is one that must be
made by military and civilian leadership.
Others have argued that using drones does not stop
terrorism. However, if prior to 9/11, the United States had been
able to eliminate any number of the hijackers through targeted
killings, the 9/11 plot would have at a minimum delayed Al
Qaeda’s plans for that day giving the U.S. government more time
to uncover the plot. Eliminating hijackers or some of the Al Qaeda
leaders could have lead to Bin Laden deciding to give up the
planned attack in total. Eliminating Al Qaeda leaderships is
arguably just as effective as eliminating some of the foot soldiers
that carry out the details of a terrorism plan.
Under the proportionality requirement, lethal force may be
used only to the extent necessary to achieve the military objective.
Without the ability to arrest and remove terrorists from positions
where they can plan more attacks, killing the leaders and other
individuals critical to the terrorist operations would be appropriate.
Some argue that the necessity and proportionality requirement
rules of jus ad bellum provide an adequate legal framework for the
use of force against the threat in any armed conflict with an
adversary.80 Others, however, point out that if a State is presently
in hostilities with an adversary, as the U.S. government has
indicated it is with respect to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups
that are attacking or seek to attack the United States, then the laws
of war are applicable during the existence of the hostilities.81
Furthermore, if the United States is not in a state of hostilities with
these actors, then the laws applicable to law enforcement
80
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measures, human rights law, would be applicable in determining
what individuals can legally be targeted.82 According to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), “international
lawfulness of a particular operation involving the use of force may
not always depend exclusively on IHL but, depending on the
circumstances, may potentially be influenced by other applicable
legal frameworks, such as human rights law and the jus ad
bellum.”83
B. Self-defense and International Humanitarian Law: Jus in Bello
Once there is justification for using force under jus ad
bellum, the law related to armed conflict, jus in bello, will dictate
what rules the parties must abide by in waging their hostilities. It
is important to distinguish these two areas of international law.
Under jus ad bellum, the reason for the use of force is important in
assessing the legality of the actions.
In contrast, under
international law, when determining whether an armed conflict
exists, triggering international humanitarian law, the purpose of the
armed forces in engaging in acts of violence is irrelevant to the
determination of whether an armed conflict exists. Under
international law there are four categories of armed hostilities that
can exist: (1) hostilities of a international armed conflict, (2)
hostilities of a non-international armed conflict that meets the
threshold of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, (3)
hostilities of a non-international armed conflict meeting the
threshold of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, or (4) hostilities
that are isolated and sporadic which are not considered to reach the
level of “armed conflict.”84
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An international armed conflict exists between two States
involving armed forces.85 When the Geneva Conventions were
drafted, it was common for States to declare wars against each
other. At that point, the rules related to armed conflict would be
triggered irrespective of the level of hostilities because it was clear
that States were involved with armed forces in conflict. Following
the definition of an international armed conflict in Article 2(1) of
the Geneva Conventions, an international armed conflict cannot
exist between a State and a non-state armed group. Therefore, the
U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists groups would
not constitute an international armed conflict.
The fourth category of hostilities, those that do not rise to
the level of armed conflict, can be ruled out in the context of the
current U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and others. As will be
discussed, the level of violence produced by Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups working with Al Qaeda surpasses any isolated and
sporadic incidents of violence. Al Qaeda and those groups that
have joined Al Qaeda in continuing its mission of killing
Americans are not isolated but, rather, are part of an ongoing effort
to destroy America. As for categories 2 and 3, the United States is
not party to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and,
therefore, category 2 is the relevant category of hostilities for
analysis to determine whether the current conflict meets the
threshold of a non-international armed conflict, thereby informing
the parties what specific rules are applicable for the duration of
hostilities. The challenges lies in the fact that Common Article 3
does not define “armed conflict,” “organization of an armed
group,” nor does it provide any indication of the degree of intensity
required for a situation to qualify as “armed conflict not of an
international character.”
In March 2012, in a speech at the American Society of
International Law, Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor,
discussed the legal justification for the Obama Administration’s
drone program. In his speech, Koh acknowledged that self-defense
is one legal basis for drone strikes but also mentioned that
85
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international humanitarian law is an additional basis, stating that
the United States is “in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, as well as
the Taliban and associated forces.”86 Koh went on to describe how
drone attacks would not take place in States that had effective law
enforcement efforts against terrorists but only in those States that
lacked such efforts or capabilities. Based upon what Koh
indicated, therefore, it is relevant to examine how the U.S. drone
program is or is not complying with the rules related to
international humanitarian law (“IHL”). The most central question
related to the drone program under IHL is whether under the
program the killing of individuals is arbitrary, which is prohibited
under the rules.
Even the former Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Killing, Summary on Arbitrary Executions noted that
targeted killings may be lawful in the context of IHL: “[A]though
in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in
the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, they may be
legal.” 87 This conclusion illustrates the importance of answering
the question of the applicability of IHL and the existence of an
armed conflict.
During an armed conflict, the law regulating the conduct of
military operations during war applies. This law is often referred
to as the “law of war,” the “law of armed conflict,” or jus in bello.
Under the Geneva Conventions, the definition of “armed conflict”
is abstract; therefore, whether or not a situation can be described as
an “armed conflict,” meeting the criteria of Common Article 3, is
to be decided on a case-by-case basis based on the facts of the
situation. These laws are distinguishable from those related to the
recourse to the use of force, jus ad bellum, as discussed above.
The rules would appear to be quite straight forward given the
specific area of conflict. However, there is much debate about the
scope and nature of the actual armed conflict that the United States
is currently engaged in with terrorists.
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The nature of the specific conflict is important since there
is a difference in the rules that apply in an international armed
conflict as distinguished from a non-international armed conflict,
particularly as it relates to targeting civilians. Historically, States
have dealt with non-state actors as internal conflicts (matters to be
dealt with under domestic law), human rights law issues, and law
enforcement matters. Therefore, the international law for noninternational armed conflicts is far less developed than the law
applicable to conflicts between States that crosses international
boundaries. However, no matter the nature of the conflict, the
intent of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions was that there
would always be protections for the victims when any type of
conflict is occurring. The ICJ has posited that the substantive
provisions of Common Article 3 reflect fundamental
considerations of humanity that are binding regardless of the
character of an armed conflict. Accordingly, Common Article 3
applies whether it is an international or non-international armed
conflict. Therefore, even if the conflict spills over into another
State’s territory and becomes transnational, as is the conflict
between the United States and Al Qaeda and its affiliates,
Common Article 3 is applicable.
1. Non-International Armed Conflict
The United States has stated that it is in a non-international,
armed conflict with Al Qaeda. In other words, the U.S. drone
program operates under the laws of war against targets that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States. Therefore, the
targeted killings are not considered “extrajudicial killings”88 or
“assassinations” because peacetime rules prohibiting such killings
are not applicable. The use of such force to kill terrorists by
drones is implemented in sovereign territories of other States only
if those States are unable or unwilling to stop the threat posed by
88
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the individuals. In circumstances where the sovereignty of other
States is concerned with targeted killings, international law
regarding the resort to force, jus ad bellum, as discussed above, can
serve to resolve the issues.
Common Article 3 provides that in “armed conflicts not of
an international character,” each party to the conflict shall observe
certain minimum standards. In other words, there are certain
prohibitions that must be honored by the parties to the conflict:
prohibitions on murder, torture, other ill-treatment, hostage-taking,
and unfair trial. As such, Common Article 3 provides rules on the
protection of persons in enemy hands, but it does not include
specific rules on the conduct of hostilities.
Although the Geneva Conventions do not define the terms
“non-international armed conflict,” under treaty, customary
international law, and international court decisions, there are
specific criteria one can point to in determining the existence of a
non-international armed conflict between a State and non-state
armed groups. The determination is premised on two factors: the
scale or intensity of the violence and the degree of organization of
the parties.89 As noted by Idi Gaparayi, the Associate Legal
Officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), “[d]etermining what counts as ‘protracted’
armed violence and as a ‘well-organized’ armed group requires a
case-specific analysis of the facts.”90 This is a determination that
must be made on a case-by-case basis given the facts at the time.
89
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Each party is under a good faith obligation to assess whether the
facts are such that, objectively, one can conclude that the conflict
is of a non-international character.
In 1995, in the Tadic case, the Appeal Chamber for the
ICTY provided a definition of non-international armed conflict:
“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State.”91 In addressing the issue of whether
the court had jurisdiction to try Tadic, a Bosian Serb, for crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
violations of the customs of war under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the
ICTY Statute, the court needed to determine whether an armed
conflict existed at the time between the parties.
The court in the Tadic judgment determined that there was
an armed conflict of a non-international characteristic. Although
the definition is broader in scope than what was considered by the
drafters of the Geneva Conventions, today it serves as an
authoritative threshold for armed conflict associated with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This definition has been
applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) and adopted in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), illustrating the definition’s widespread
international legal authority. In recognizing that the elements of a
91
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non-international armed conflict existed, it triggered the
application of international humanitarian law. The application of
the court’s criteria to the current U.S. conflict against non-state
actor groups of terrorists is particularly relevant in assessing the
nature of the conflict and applicable international humanitarian
laws. The next section follows the example of how the definition
has been applied by the ICTY, developing a framework for the
analysis of facts on a case-by-case basis that can be applied to the
current U.S. conflict.
2. Determining the
Humanitarian Law

Applicability

of

International

In rendering a judgment on the merits, the Trial Chamber in
Tadic explained that the purpose of the definition was to
distinguish “an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and
short-lived insurrections, or terrorists activities, which are not
subject to international humanitarian law.”92 In other words, for
hostilities to amount to a non-international armed conflict, where
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions would be
applicable, the level of hostilities would need to reach a certain
level. For those hostilities where the level of violence was low,
such as with criminal activities, human rights law would be
applicable and not humanitarian law. In the Trial Chamber of the
Delalic case, the ICTY supported this interpretation of a noninternational armed conflict and used the definition to distinguish
between “cases of civil unrest or terrorist activities, the emphasis is
on the protracted extent of the armed violence.”93 Importantly, the
Kordic and Cerkez Appeals Chamber reiterated the significance of
the two characteristics of the conflict and further explained what
the court meant when it identified terrorist activities. The court
stated, “[T]he requirement of protracted fighting is significant in
excluding mere cases of civil unrest or single acts of terrorism.”94
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A. Organization of Parties
According to the ICRC, “armed groups opposing a
government must have a minimum degree of organization and
discipline.”95 While the Tadic decision did not define what
constitutes an “organized armed group,” subsequent case law
provided some guidance on the meaning of the terms. In the
Milosevic trial, the court looked to the following elements in
determining sufficient level of organization of the armed groups:
official joint command structure, headquarters, designated zones of
operation, and ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms.96
Later in the Limaj trial, the court adopted the Tadic test and,
following the Milosevic case, found that the Kosovo Liberation
Army (“KLA”) was sufficiently organized due to the following
factors: the role of the General Staff as the main governing body of
the KLA carrying out such functions as appointing zone
commanders, supplying weapons, issuing political statements,
distributing regulations to members of the group, authorization to
carry out specific hostile acts, and the assignment of tasks to
individuals within the organization.97
Like the KLA, Al Qaeda has shown the ability to formulate
and declare a change in operational tactics as well as dictating
conditions for refraining from further hostile action. This reflects
how Al Qaeda continues to coordinate military planning and
activities and to determine a unified military strategy. The ability
to do these things does not depend on having a hierarchical
command structure. As many have noted, Al Qaeda, post 9/11, has
morphed into a more networked organizational structure.
However, to meet the Tadic test, the command structure is not as
relevant to this analysis as is the ability of the group to exhibit
95
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specific characteristics related to organizational stability, in
whichever form that may be, that allow for operational
effectiveness.
A certain level of effectiveness is indicative of a level of
organization of the armed groups. Al Qaeda and its affiliated
groups have been successful in identifying the enemy to attack and
laying out a plan to achieve that objective. The leadership has
been able to provide direction to its members as well as issuing
public statements about its objectives. Even when Bin Laden was
in hiding, he used taped videos and couriers to deliver messages to
his members and the general public. As the court indentified in the
Limaj case, the KLA had the ability to recruit, train, and equip new
members; this was evidence of the group’s level of organization.98
Even after the United States bombed Al Qaeda’s training camps in
Afghanistan in 1998, Al Qaeda and its new members have been
able to gain access to training in Pakistan. After 9/11, plots
thwarted through the arrest of suspects often revealed evidence that
individuals had been to Pakistan to receive training from Al Qaeda.
An additional indicator of Al Qaeda’s level of organization is that
individual members of Al Qaeda that have been arrested or
detained are in possession of weapons.
Al Qaeda is an organized, armed group capable of being a
party to a conflict.
While Al Qaeda may be changing
organizationally due to a process of decentralization, this does not
diminish its ability to recruit, train, provide operational direction,
affiliate funding of operations, and carry out armed attacks. The
United States is not targeting these groups solely because they are
trafficking in drugs or humans, money laundering, counterfeiting,
or arms trading. These terrorist groups are not criminal gangs or
drug cartels, although they may use criminal activities to finance
their terrorist attacks. It is significant that the United States is not
using drone strikes to target criminals. For those international
criminals, the law enforcement framework under international law
would be appropriate. In fact, the United States applies the law
enforcement framework under those circumstances. However, for
98
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terrorists who are identifiable as a group and commit acts of
violence with such intensity as 9/11, the United States
appropriately employs the non-international armed conflict
framework and the international humanitarian rules that are
applicable.
B. Intensity of Hostilities
Similar to the organizational requirement, the threshold of
“protracted armed violence” requires the interpretation of facts in
the context of the U.S.-Al Qaeda conflict. It is clear that the
requisite level of intensity of hostilities for the existence of armed
conflict must be above that of internal disturbances and tensions.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the level of hostilities need
not reach the magnitude of “sustained and concerted military
operations.” In determining the requisite level of intensity for
hostilities to qualify as an armed conflict, the interpretation of the
word “protracted” is central. In the Limaj case, the court used a
similar approach to the Milosevic case and relied on a number of
factors in assessing the intensity of the violence: seriousness of
armed clashes, mobilization of troops, kind of weaponry,
destruction of property, and the existence of casualties.99
While “protracted” implies a time frame, it “does not carry
the same meaning as ‘sustained’.”100 Therefore, “there is no
requirement that military operations be carried out in a sustained or
continuous manner.”101 The assessment of “protracted” hostilities
is one that begins with the initiation of hostilities and continues to
the end of the hostilities. The Rome State of the ICC accepts the
definition of non-international armed conflict and maintains that
international humanitarian law applies even in situations of
protracted armed violence where hostilities are not necessarily
characterized as continuous, giving support to the argument that
hostilities do not need to be “sustained and concerted” military
99
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operations as Additional Protocol II dictates. Just because there
may be interruptions in fighting between parties does not mean that
international humanitarian law ceases in being applicable. In the
case of Al Qaeda, as described before, the group has been engaged
in hostilities against the United States since the early 1990s. And
while attacks have often been thwarted prior to and after 9/11, the
group continues to maintain its mission to kill Americans and
destroy the country.
The more difficult case here is in assessing the criteria of
protracted violence as it related to several non-state parties
involved in the conflict against the United States. Central to the
analysis is whether the hostilities originating from the several
different non-state parties can be aggregated in considering
whether hostilities are protracted. This will depend on the
relationship between the non-state parties. Since 9/11 the United
States successfully killed a number of Al Qaeda leaders and foot
soldiers, arguably making it more difficult for the group to carry
out its objectives. What many terrorism experts have described is
that Al Qaeda has partnered with other terrorist groups that can
assist them in operating in different territories, sustaining their
training, arming, and recruiting. Although the groups may have
different names and, for some, different goals, they join together in
one common purpose: to fight and attack the United States. These
groups at times maintain their own command structure and merge
together in a joint command style. The attacks against the United
States from Al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan, AQAP, and others
have not been disconnected, isolated, or sporadic acts of violence.
Furthermore, the acts of violence by these other groups are tied to
the conflict at issue with the United States. The attacks are not
about any other issue other than destroying the United States.
They have been ongoing and connected through the common
agenda and direction of the groups. As noted above, the attacks do
not have to be of a continuous nature.
C. Standards Under International Humanitarian Law
(i) Level of Force to be Used
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According to the ICRC, the IHL requirement related to the
legitimate use of force is that the kind and amount of force used in
a military operation be limited to that which is “actually necessary
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing
circumstances.”102 In circumstances where the State has control
over the territory where a military operation is taking place, it may
be feasible for the State to use less-than-lethal means to stop the
civilian from causing violence to the State. For example, the State
could detain and arrest the individual. This, however, is not a
requirement under the law. Under circumstances where a State
determines that it could capture the individual instead of killing
him, the State ought to use less lethal force in stopping the threat.
In countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia where the United
States does not have a presence and the host State may not be able
or willing to arrest the individual terrorists, IHL would permit the
use of lethal force against the target as long as that person was a
lawful target.
(ii) Who are Lawful Targets and Where
Common Article 3 does not provide any guidance on the
rules related to the conduct of hostilities. According to the ICRC,
there are rules that would apply to non-international armed conflict
related to the conduct of hostilities; they are rules that U.S. has
accepted. For example, parties to the conflict must distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Attacks cannot be directed at
civilians but only combatants. Civilian objects are protected from
attack. Further, the principle of proportionality would apply.
Members of organized armed forces or groups are
legitimate targets. These individuals are those whose continuous
function is to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the armed
conflict. Civilians are not legitimate targets. They are individuals
who do not directly participate in hostilities or who does so on a
merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis. Once a
102
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civilian directly participated in hostilities, he then becomes a
combatant and a legitimate target. In non-international armed
conflicts, all persons who are not members of State armed forces or
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and,
therefore, are entitled to protections from direct attack until they
forgo those protections by participating directly in the conflict.
In non-international armed conflicts, individual members of
organized armed groups are people who have a continuous
function to directly participate in the hostilities. Therefore, the key
terms for determining if members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups can be directly targeted is whether they have a continuous
combat function. The fact that an individual has a continuous
combat function, however, does not provide any combat privileges
to the individual. This fact merely makes him a legitimate target.
Importantly, however, for those individuals who are civilians and
may have transitioned into combatants by directly participating in
hostilities, but do so only on a spontaneous, sporadic or
unorganized basis, or take on only non-combat functions,
according to the ICRC, they are protected from direct attack.
In a non-international armed conflict, under humanitarian
legal rules, States are permitted to attack those civilians who
“directly participate in hostilities.” The basis of this premise is that
civilians lose their immunity from attack when they behave like
combatants. Yet, the law does not provide a definition for direct
participation in hostilities. Generally, the more similar a civilian’s
actions are to those of a traditional fighter, the easier it becomes to
argue that the civilian is participating in hostilities. For example,
civilians who shoot at the State forces or cause injury or death to
State forces are generally treated as legitimate targets.
According to the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, the
determination of what is considered direct participation in
hostilities depends on whether the conduct at issue “constitute[s]
an integral part of armed confrontations occurring between
belligerents.”103 The ICRC sets forth a three-part test for
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determining when an individual can be considered to be directly
participating in hostilities. This includes the consideration of the
threshold of harm posed by his or her actions, the causal link
between his or her actions and the potential harm to the opponent,
and the nexus to the hostilities. In addition to those involved in the
physical attacks themselves, the ICRC also includes individuals
who conduct preparatory activities of a specific act of direct
participation in hostilities as well as any concluding activities
related to the specific act, to include the return from the location of
the actual act. The central point is that all of these acts have a
proximate casual to the specific act that reached the threshold of
harm.
Significantly, according to the ICRC’s guidance on civilian
status, civilians who do participate directly in hostilities (in other
words, civilians who become combatants) and who have a
“continuous combat function” can be targeted at all times and in all
places, even when they are not directly participating in hostilities.
The ICRC’s position on this is in line with the Tadic Appeals
Chamber, which held that “the temporal and geographical scope of
both internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the
exact time and place of hostilities.”104 This could include
individuals who organize, equip, provide intelligence for, or
otherwise direct the hostile activities of subordinates and
collaborators on a continuous basis (i.e., acts qualifying under the
threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus criteria).
These are the factors that are to be considered when individuals are
placed on the target list. However, civilians who become
combatants because they directly participate in hostilities, but who
do not have a “continuous combat function,” can only be targeted
for the duration of each specific act that amounts to participating in
direct hostilities.
Although the United States has not publicly discussed the
factors that are considered for putting someone on a drone target
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list, U.S. officials have discussed the identity of a number of the
targets that have been killed. Individuals who have been targeted
and killed by drones have been described as members who had
operational roles within Al Qaeda. Membership and affiliation
with such a group, directly supporting initiatives that seek to kill
Americans and destroy the very way of life for Americans, has
forced the United States and other States to change the methods
used in defense of the State. It is likely that the use of such
methods will not be reversed; therefore, understanding how
domestic and international laws work to incorporate and impose
restrictions upon them is critically important for States using
drones as well as the rest of the international community.

